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Abstract. In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining pro-
cedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining
vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about
personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since
this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic founda-
tion for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods
problem.
1. Introduction
The private provision of public goods in general leads to inefficient allocations in
a competitive market environment. This inefficiency is often attributed to a missing
market. If personalized markets could be created that individually price the public
good for each agent, then a competitive equilibrium could implement an efficient
allocation. For an economy with public goods, this outcome is known as a Lin-
dahl equilibrium. Typically, however, a Lindahl equilibrium is deemed unrealistic
because of a serious shortcoming: in the personalized markets upon which it rests
the agents are assumed to have a price-taking behavior. But unfortunately, by the
personalized nature of those markets, there is only one single agent on the demand
side in each of them, which makes price-taking behavior of this single agent an
utterly unrealistic assumption. On contrast, we propose in this paper a bargaining
procedure that leads (without the need of assuming price-taking behavior) to an
outcome arbitrarily close to a Lindahl allocation as the cost of bargaining vanishes.
As a matter of fact, the two only agents of our model (for the sake of simplicity)
have quite on the contrary a lot of market power.
In the case of a missing market (as it happens in the presence of a public good),
one way to allocate the surplus left unappropriated is through Coasian bargaining.
As pointed by Coase, as long as there remain gains from trade the parties involved
have incentives to get together and strike a deal. The main feature of such bargain-
ing is that it is decentralized (no benevolent government must intervene), and the
extent to which the surplus can be allocated to the parties depends on the details
of the bargaining protocol and on whether the bargaining is costly or not.
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The study of this type of bargaining in legislatures has already been addressed in
Baron and Ferejohn (1989), where a model is presented in which one of the different
possible ways to divide a given pie is chosen by a vote according to the majority
rule. It turns out that typically there exist many equilibria for this procedure.
Banks and Duggan (2000) present a far more general model in which the space
of alternatives is a compact, convex subset of a multidimensional Euclidean space.
They consider arbitrary voting rules and prove the existence of stationary equilib-
ria, the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium proposals in structural and preference
parameters, and a core equivalence result. While several of these bargaining set-ups
encompass economies with public goods, they differ from our own set-up in that
ours implicitly imposes constraints on what the proposer is able to offer to other
agents. We believe these constraints reflect in a natural way the sharing of power
in a bargaining situation over both the output level and the financing of a public
good. At any rate, as a consequence of imposing such constraints on the offers, the
bargaining protocol considered here allows to attain (in the limiting case of vanish-
ing bargaining costs) the outcome that would result from completing the markets
that are missing because of the presence of a public good, but without resorting to
the heroic assumption of price-taking behavior with respect to personalized prices.
Specifically, in order to formalize the Coasian procedure of extracting rents,
we propose a sequential bargaining as a collective decision making process. Its
sequential nature reflects a realistic feature of the power of setting the agenda of
the negotiation. The proposal and acceptance decisions are endogenous. Agents can
reject a proposal and have it modified in their turn. Because of the cost of any delay
in reaching an agreement, the bargaining outcome will in general be inefficient thus
reflecting the power of setting the agenda: when there is impatience for reaching an
agreement, the agent who makes an offer that is accepted will extract more rents
at the cost of inefficiency. As the impatience or cost of a delay vanishes, those rents
disappear and the allocation is efficient and independent of who had the power of
setting the agenda.
In this paper we show that, despite the fact that output decisions for public
goods and their mode of financing are often the result of a political process rife with
opportunities for strategic behavior, the Lindahl allocations can be implemented
without assuming price-taking behavior with respect to personalized prices. This is
obtained precisely through a strategic bargaining of the parties over the financing of
the public good.1 In order to show this we take here a first step towards modelling
the political process behind output and financing decisions with regard to public
goods as a sequential bargaining game of complete information.
Specifically, we consider an economy with any finite number of public goods and
private goods (not necessarily the same number of each). There are two agents in
this economy who take turns alternatingly (as in Rubinstein (1982)) to propose a
maximum level of provision of each of the public goods and a way to split between
them the cost of financing any level of the public goods to be provided up to the
1The mixed competitive mechanisms proposed in Groves and Ledyard (1977) obviously can
efficiently allocate private and public goods to coincide with the Lindahl allocation (see also Tian
(1989)). However, those direct mechanisms both rely on a centralized mechanism designer and
they may involve complicated mechanisms. The virtue here is that an efficient allocation of private
and public goods is obtained through a decentralized bargaining procedure. It is simple: it relies
explicitly on personalized contributions (taxes) and incorporates the notion that agenda setters
have power to extract more rents when bargaining is costly.
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proposed maxima (this amounts to proposing personalized prices or taxes). The
other agent can then either accept or reject the proposal. In case of acceptance,
this other agent chooses the amount of each public good to be provided (subject
to the maximum amount offered in the proposal). Each agent pays for the public
goods according to the personalized prices agreed upon. The levels of public goods
and their financing are fixed thereafter so the game is effectively over. If instead
the other agent rejects the proposal, then it is his turn to make a proposal himself
of a new maximum amounts and personalized prices, and so on.
Within this set-up we show that, as the discount factors of each agent in the
economy converge to one (no matter how), the allocation of any stationary subgame
perfect equilibrium converges to a Lindahl equilibrium allocation. Specifically, we
show first that, for infinitely patient agents (i.e. for discount factors equal to 1),
the set of Lindahl allocations coincides with the set of stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium allocations of the alternating-offers bargaining game described above.
Then we establish the upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence mapping, to
each pair of discount factors, the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
allocations of the bargaining game, and in particular its upper hemicontinuity for
discount factors δA = δB = 1. The conclusion then follows from these two results.
In this simple set-up, unanimity plays an important role in our modelling. In
effect, a tax proposal can be adopted only if it is acceptable to every agent. This
has the virtue of conferring a Wicksellian character to the Lindahl solution to
the public goods problem. In effect, in a classical contribution to the theory of
public finance, Wicksell [9] proposed unanimity as the criterion for just taxation.
The game we propose incorporates the need of achieving consensus to effect tax
proposals that to some extent may characterize budgetary procedures in political
regimes with multiple checks and balances or in parliamentary democracies without
a majority party. Inefficiencies associated with bargaining are shown to disappear as
agents become increasingly patient. Thus, a Wicksellian procedure turns out to be
consistent with a Lindahl result. Of course, this result depends on the assumption
of complete information.
2. The model
We consider first a public good economy consisting of only two agents A and
B, but an arbitrary number n + m of goods: n private goods x1, . . . , xn and m
public goods y1, . . . , ym. The agents are infinitely lived and time is discrete. For
each agent i = A,B, let xi ∈ Rn+ be i’s consumption of the private good, and
let y ∈ Rm+ be their common consumption of the public good. The agents have
preferences over the two types of goods represented by standard utility functions
uA(xA, y) and uB(xB , y).2 The agents are endowed with amounts ei (with total
endowment e = eA + eB) of the private goods, and as a normalization, we assume
the initial amount of the public goods is zero. A linear technology M ∈ Rn×m
allows to produce each public good yj by means of the private goods, requiring mij
units of private good xi for each unit of yj , for all i = 1, . . . , n.
We consider an alternating-offers bargaining game. In any given period prior
to an agreement, an agent i makes an offer consisting of a vector pi = (pxi, pyi)
of prices for the other agent (in terms of, say, the private good x1) and an upper
2That is to say C2, monotone, differentiably strictly quasi-concave, non-negative utility func-
tions that are well-behaved at the boundary of Rn+m+ .
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bound qi to the contribution of private goods to the provision of public goods or,
equivalently, to the provision of public goods itself. After receiving an offer the
other agent can either accept it or reject it. In case of acceptance, the accepting
agent chooses his consumption of private goods and the quantities of public goods
to be provided subject to the accepted prices pi and upper bound on trades qi.
This procedure is repeated until a proposal is accepted. The utility of each agent
i is discounted in each iteration by a positive discount factor δi not bigger than 1.
The utility of never reaching an agreement is 0.
At this point it is worth observing that the right to make a proposal can be
thought of as a property right over the surplus from the public good. The details of
those property rights will certainly matter when bargaining is costly —as we will
show below. However, one of our findings is that the way in which property rights
are assigned does not matter when the cost of a delay disappears.
3. The stationary subgame perfect (SSP) equilibrium allocations
We consider first the stationary subgame perfect equilibria without delay of
this game (i.e. an equilibrium in which no agent has incentives to reject the offer
received). Such equilibria are characterized by an offer (pA, qA) of a vector of prices
and a maximum amount for the contributions of private goods or the provisions of
public goods that A offers to B and a similar offer made by (pB , qB), such that,
for instance, (pA, qA) maximizes the utility that A obtains from B’s immediate
acceptance of his offer (pA, qA), subject to the constraint that it is indeed in B’s
interest to accept (pA, qA), i.e. (pA, qA) solves
maxuA(e− x˜B(pA, qA)−My˜B(pA, qA), y˜B(pA, qA)) (1)
subject to the constraint
uB(x˜B(pA, qA),y˜B(pA, qA)) ≥
δBuB(e− x˜A(pB , qB)−My˜A(pB , qB), y˜A(pB , qB))
(2)
given pB , qB —where x˜B(pA, qA), y˜B(pA, qA) is the solution to
maxuB(x, y)
pA · (x− eB , y) ≤ 0
‖(x− eB , y)‖ ≤ qA,5
(3)
— and symmetrically for (pB , qB). That is to say, A’s offer maximizes the utility
that A will derive from B’s immediate acceptance of the offer, provided that the
offer is such that B is interested indeed in accepting immediately the offer.
Note however that a SSP equilibrium without delay can equivalently be charac-
terized by the allocations effectively offered by the agents. In effect, conditional to
immediate acceptance, an offer by A of (pA, qA) amounts to offering B the bundle
(x˜B(pA, qA), y˜B(pA, qA)), which is characterized by satisfying the condition
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
(
xB − eB
y
)
≥ 0. (4)
5 The choice of the norm is inessential.
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Conversely, any bundle (xB , y) satisfying the previous inequality is solution to B’s
problem above for some offer (pA, yA) by A. This fact is established in Lemma 1
in the Appendix.
As a consequence, A SSP equilibrium without delay can also be characterized by
allocations (xAA, x
B
A , yA) and (x
A
B , x
B
B , yB), proposed by A and B respectively, such
that (xAA, x
B
A , yA) solves
maxuA(xA, y)
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
(
xB − eB
y
)
≥ 0
uB(xB , y) ≥ δBuB(xBB , yB)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB
(5)
given (xAB , x
B
B , yB), and (x
A
B , x
B
B , yB) solves
maxuB(xB , y)
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y))
(
xA − eA
y
)
≥ 0
uA(xA, y) ≥ δAuA(xAA, yA)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB
(6)
given (xAA, x
B
A , yA).
4. The Lindahl allocations
A Lindahl equilibrium allocation (xA, xB , y) is characterized by satisfying that
(1) the allocation is feasible, i.e. xA, xB , y ≥ 0 and
xA + xB +My = eA + eB (7)
(2) it allocates to each agent i his demand (xi, y) at his personalized relative
prices (implicitly equal to the marginal rates of substitution determined by
his marginal utilities at (xi, y)), i.e. for i = A,B,
(uix(x
i, y), uiy(x
i, y))
(
xi − ei
y
)
= 0. (8)
For the case of one private good and one public good, Lindahl Equilibrium
allocations can be represented in a Kolm triangle, the public goods equivalent of
the Edgeworth box of a private goods exchange economy (see Figure 1 below).
The orthogonal distance from any point within the triangle to each of its sides
represents each agent’s allocation of the private good (xA and xB), while the vertical
distance to the base of the triangle represents their common consumption y of the
public good. The triangular form accounts for the linear production technology: an
increase in the quantity of public goods produced implies an proportional decrease
in the quantity of private goods that remain for consumption. Thus, at the initial
endowment e there is no provision of the public good.
5
Figure 1
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The personalized prices pA and pB represent the terms of exchange of one unit of
public good for pA units of the private good from agent A and pB units of private
good from agent B. A balanced budget where the total contributions equal the
total cost of production of the public good implies that for all y,
∑I
i=1 p
iy = y. For
a given price schedule p, the offer curve OCi gives the optimal amount of public
good and private good demanded by agent i at those terms of trade. An intersection
of the offer curves represents then optimal quantities of the public good and the
private good consumed by the agents given a vector of personalized prices that
balances the budget. This corresponds to a Lindahl equilibrium allocation. There
are of course other efficient allocation represented by the Pareto set P , but they
are not attainable by means of price schedules starting from the initial endowment
e.
5. SSP equilibrium allocations are
Lindahl allocations when δA = δB = 1
First we show that for infinitely patient agents, that is to say, when the discount
factors δA and δB are 1, the Lindahl equilibrium allocations, and only these allo-
cations, are offered at a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining
game above.
Theorem 1. When δA = δB = 1, at every SSP equilibrium with immediate accep-
tance the agents’ offers lead to the same allocation which is, moreover, the allocation
of a Lindahl equilibrium. Conversely, every Lindahl equilibrium allocation is the
allocation offered by the two agents at some SSP equilibrium without delay.
Proof. Let (xAA, x
B
A , yA) and (x
A
B , x
B
B , yB) be the feasible allocations resulting from
B’s (resp. A’s) acceptance of A’s (resp. B’s) offer of price and maximum provisions
of public goods at a SSP equilibrium with immediate acceptance for infinitely many
patients. That is to say, let (xAA, x
B
A , yA) and (x
A
B , x
B
B , yB) be such that
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(1)
(xAA, x
B
A , yA) ∈ arg max
xA,xB ,y
uA(xA, y)
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
(
xB − eB
y
)
≥ 0
uB(xB , y) ≥ uB(xBB , yB)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB
given (xAB , x
B
B , yB)
(9)
(2)
(xAB , x
B
B , yB) ∈ arg max
xA,xB ,y
uB(xB , y)
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y))
(
xA − eA
y
)
≥ 0
uA(xA, y) ≥ uA(xA, y)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB
given (xAA, x
B
A , yA).
(10)
Then necessarily, from the first-order conditions, there exist multipliers λA, µA,
λB , µB ≥ 0 and νA, νB such thatuAx (xAA, yA)0
uAy (x
A
A, yA)
+ λA
 0uBx (xBA , yA)
uBy (xBA , yA)

+ µA
 0uBx (xBA , yA) + uBxx(xBA , yA)(xBA − eB) + uByx(xBA , yA)yA
uBy (xBA , yA) + u
B
xy(xBA , yA)(x
B
A − eB) + uByy(xBA , yA)yA

+
n∑
i=1
νAi
 eiei
mti·
 = 0
(11)
where mti· is the i-th row of M transposed as a column, or equivalently, eliminating
the multipliers νAi(
uAx (x
A
A, yA)
M tuAx (x
A
A, yA)− uAy (xAA, yA)
)
= λA
(
uBx (x
B
A , yA)
uBy (x
B
A , yA)
)
+ µA
(
uBx (x
B
A , yA) + u
B
xx(x
B
A , yA) (x
B
A − eB) + uByx(xBA , yA) yA
uBy (x
B
A , yA) + u
B
xy(x
B
A , yA) (x
B
A − eB) + uByy(xBA , yA) yA
) (12)
and similarly(
uBx (xBB , yB)
M tuBx (x
B
B , yB)− uBy (xBB , yB)
)
= λB
(
uAx (xAB , yB)
uAy (x
A
B , yB)
)
+ µB
(
uAx (x
A
B , yB) + u
A
xx(x
A
B , yB)(x
A
B − eA) + uAyx(xAB , yB)yB
uAy (x
A
B , yB) + u
A
xy(x
A
B , yB)(x
A
B − eA) + uAyy(xAB , yB)yB
) (13)
7
Assume that (xAA, x
B
A , yA) 6= (xAB , xBB , yB). Since at a SSPE with δA = 1 = δB
the constraints
uA(xAB , yB) ≥ uA(xAA, yA)
uB(xBA , yA) ≥ uB(xBB , yB)
(14)
are binding3 (and hence both allocations are on the same indifference surface for
both agents ),4 then none of these two allocations can be efficient while being
different. Therefore the efficiency condition that(
uAx (x
A, y)
uAy (x
A, y)
)
and
(
uBx (x
B , y)
M tuBx (x
B , y)− uBy (xB , y)
)
(15)
are collinear cannot hold neither at (xAA, x
B
A , yA) nor at (x
A
B , x
B
B , yB). In particular,
there exist h, k such that
uAyk(x
A
B , yB)
uAxh(x
A
B , yB)
<
∑n
i=1miku
B
xi(x
B
B , yB)− uByk(xBB , yB)
uBxh(x
B
B , yB)
(16)
(a similar argument applies if the inequality holds the other way), then (13) above
cannot be satisfied for non-negative multipliers (in the case the inequality is reversed
it is condition (12) above that cannot be satisfied for non-negative multipliers).
In effect, since (λB , µB) must solve (13) above, then it must also solve(
uBxh(x
B
B , yB)∑n
i=1miku
B
xi(x
B
B , yB)− uByk(xBB , yB)
)
= λB
(
uAxh(x
A
B , yB)
uAyk(x
A
B , yB)
)
+ µB
(
uAxh(x
A
B , yB) + u
A
xhxh
(xAB , yB)(x
A
B − eA) + uAykxh(xAB , yB)yB
uAyk(x
A
B , yB) + u
A
xhyk
(xAB , yB)(x
A
B − eA) + uAykyk(xAB , yB)yB
) (17)
so that in particular µB is
µB =
∣∣∣∣uAxh(xAB , yB) uBxh(xBB , yB)uAyk(xAB , yB) ∑ni=1mikuBxi(xBB , yB)− uByk(xBB , yB)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣uAxh(xAB , yB) uAxh(xAB , yB) + uAxhxh(xAB , yB)(xAB − eA) + uAykxh(xAB , yB)yBuAyk(xAB , yB) uAyk(xAB , yB) + uAxhyk(xAB , yB)(xAB − eA) + uAykyk(xAB , yB)yB
∣∣∣∣ .
(18)
Since µ ≥ 0 necessarily and the numerator is strictly positive according to (16),
so must be the denominator. But this denominator is equivalent to the following
expression which in fact happens to have the opposite sign,
(−uAyk(xAB , yB) uAxh(xAB , yB) )
·
[(
uAxh(x
A
B , yB)
uAyk(x
A
B , yB)
)
+
(
uAxhxh(x
A
B , yB) u
A
xhyk
(xAB , yB)
uAykxh(x
A
B , yB) u
A
ykyk
(xAB , yB)
)(
xAhB − eAh
ykB
)]
≤ 0
(19)
3For instance, since (xAA, x
B
A , yA) satisfies Du
A(xA, y)(xA − eA, y) ≥ 0 (agent A will never
choose at equilibrium to let B ask for a provision of public goods bigger than the one necessary
to attain A’s demand at the implicit prices), then necessary uB(xBA , yA) ≤ uB(xBB , yB) holds as
well.
4Note that for this step to hold true it is crucial to have the equality of the discount factors
δA and δB to 1.
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since the first scalar product is null and the Hessian of uA at (xAB , yB) is semi-definite
negative in the space orthogonal to the gradient of uA at (xAB , yB) and hence also to
any (0, . . . , 0, xAhB−eAh , 0, . . . , 0, ykB , 0, . . . , 0) orthogonal to (uAx (xAB , yB), uAy (xAB , yB)),
i.e. for all (xAhB − eAh , ykB) such that
uAxh(x
A
B , yB) (x
A
hB − eAh ) + uAyk(xAB , yB) yAkB = 0 (20)
(note that in this case (−uAyk(xAB , yB), uAxh(xAB , yB)) is collinear to (xAhB − eAh , ykB)
up to a positive constant).
Therefore (xAA, x
B
A , yA) = (x
A
B , x
B
B , yB) necessarily, i.e. whenever δ
A = 1 = δB at
a SSP equilibrium with immediate acceptance the two agents offer the same allo-
cation. Let then xA, xB , y be the common allocation offered at a SSP equilibrium
when δA = 1 = δB , i.e. such that
(1)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB (21)
(2)
(xA, y) ∈ argmaxuB(e− xˆA −Myˆ, yˆ)
(uAx (xˆ
A, yˆ), uAy (xˆ
A, yˆ))
(
xˆA − eA
yˆ
)
≥ 0
uA(xˆA, yˆ) ≥ uA(e− xB −My, y)
given xB , y
(22)
(3) and
(xB , y) ∈ argmaxuA(e− xˆB −Myˆ, yˆ)
(uBx (xˆ
B , yˆ), uBy (xˆ
B , yˆ))
(
xˆB − eB
yˆ
)
≥ 0
uB(xˆB , yˆ) ≥ uB(e− xA −My, y)
given xA, y
(23)
Assume that
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y))
(
xA − eA
y
)
> 0 (24)
Then, since both uA and uB are concave,
(xA, y) ∈ argmaxuB(e− xˆA −Myˆ, yˆ)
uA(xˆA, yˆ) ≥ uA(e− xB −My, y)
given xB , y
(25)
Therefore, there exists λ > 0 such that(
uAx (xA, y)
uAy (x
A, y)
)
= λ
(
uBx (xB , y)
M tuBx (x
B , y)− uBy (xB , y)
)
= λ
(
In 0
M t −Im
)(
uBx (x
B , y)
uBy (x
B , y)
) (26)
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But since
(1)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB (27)
(2)
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y))
(
xA − eA
y
)
> 0 (28)
and
(3) for some λ > 0,
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y)) = λ−1(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
(
In M
0 −Im
)
, (29)
then
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
(
xB − eB
y
)
< 0!! (30)
contradicting (3) above. Therefore
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y))
(
xA − eA
y
)
= 0 (31)
and similarly
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
(
xB − eB
y
)
= 0 (32)
i.e, the allocations proposed by both agents at a SSP equilibrium is on both agents’
offer curves so that it is a Lindahl equilibrium allocation.
Conversely, let xA, xB , y be the allocation of a Lindahl equilibrium, i.e. such
that
(1)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB (33)
(2)
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y))
(
xA − eA
y
)
= 0 (34)
(3) and
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
(
xB − eB
y
)
= 0. (35)
Let (pA, qA) be ((uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y)), y) and, similarly, let (pB , qB) be the vec-
tor ((uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y)), y), so that xA = x˜A(pB , qB), xB = x˜B(pA, qA) and
y˜A(pB , qB) = y = y˜B(pA, qA). Then it can be easily checked that the Lindahl
allocation (xA, xB , y) is the outcome of the following SSP equilibrium profile of
strategies:
(1) A offers (pA, qA) whenever he has the opportunity to do so, and accepts
only offers (p, q) such that
uA(x˜A(p, q), y˜A(p, q)) ≥ δAuA(x˜A(pB , qB), y˜A(pB , qB)) (36)
(2) B offers (pB , qB) whenever he has the opportunity to do so, and accepts
only offers (p, q) such that
uB(x˜B(p, q), y˜B(p, q)) ≥ δBuB(x˜B(pA, qA), y˜B(pA, qA)). (37)
QED
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6. Convergence of SSP equilibrium allocations
to Lindahl allocations as δA, δB → 1
In the relevant case in which bargaining entails some frictions, so that the factors
by which the agents discount future utilities are strictly smaller than 1, any SSP
equilibrium allocation is still arbitrarily close to a Lindahl allocation if agents are
patient enough. This is a consequence of the upper hemicontinuity of the correspon-
dence of SSP equilibrium allocations with respect to the agents’ discount factors,
as Theorem 2 next establishes.
Theorem 2. Every SSP equilibrium allocation converges to a Lindahl allocation
as δA, δB → 1.
Proof. Consider the correspondence Φ defined as
Φ(xAA, x
B
A , yA, x
A
B , x
B
B , yB ; δ
A, δB) =
arg max
0≤xA,xB ,y
uA(xA, y)× arg max
0≤xA,xB ,y
uB(xB , y)
DuB(xB ,y)
 
xB−eB
y
)
≥0 DuA(xA,y)
 
xA−eA
y
)
≥0
uB(xB ,y)≤δBuB(xBB ,yB) uA(xA,y)≥δAuA(xAA,yA)
xA+xB+My=eA+eB xA+xB+My=eA+eB
given (xAB ,x
B
B ,yB) given (x
A
A,x
B
A ,yA)
(38)
where Dui(xi, y) stands for (uix(x
i, y), uiy(x
i, y)), for all i = A,B. Note that, by
the Theorem of the Maximum,
arg max
0≤xA,xB ,y
uA(xA, y)
DuB(xB ,y)
 
xB−eB
y
)
≥0
uB(xB ,y)≥δBuB(xBB ,yB)
xA+xB+My=eA+eB
given (xAB ,x
B
B ,yB)
(39)
is a compact-valued, upper hemicontinuous correspondence that depends explicitly
on xBB , yB , and δ
B but also trivially on xAB and x
A
A, x
B
A , yA, δ
A.5 And similarly
for agent A’s problem. Therefore, Φ is the cartesian product of compact-valued,
upper hemicontinuous correspondences, and hence it is compact-valued and upper
hemicontinuous itself.6
5Since uA depends continuously on xA, y and also trivially on xAA, x
B
A , yA, x
A
B , x
B
B , yB , δ
A, δB ,
and the correspondence defined by the constraints
ΩA(xAA, x
B
A , yA, x
A
B , x
B
B , yB , δ
A, δB) =
{
(xA, xB , y) ∈ R2n+m |DuB(xB , y)

xB−eB
y
≥ 0
uB(xB , y) ≥ δBuB(xBB , yB)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB
}
is continuous and compact-valued.
6See Lemma A1 in Da´vila-Eeckhout (2008).
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Consider the correspondence Γ of fixed points of Φ as a function of δA, δB , i.e.
Γ(δA, δB) =
{
(xAA, x
B
A , yA, x
A
B , x
B
B , yB) ∈ R2(2n+m) |
(xAA, x
B
A , yA, x
A
B , x
B
B , yB) ∈ Φ(xAA, xBA , yA, xAB , xBB , yB ; δA, δB)
}
.
(40)
Since Φ is compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous, then the correspondence
mapping to each pair (δA, δB) the fixed points of Φ(·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, δA, δB) is upper
hemicontinuous.7
Finally, note that Γ is the correspondence of SSP equilibrium allocations (with-
out delay). Since this correspondence is upper hemicontinuous, in particular at
(δA, δB) = (1, 1) and, according to Theorem 1, Γ(1, 1) is the set of Lindahl alloca-
tions, then the claim follows.
QED
Appendix
Lemma 1. If (x, y) solves
maxu(x, y)
p · (x− e, y) ≤ 0
‖(x− eB , y)‖ ≤ qA
(A.1)
then
Du(x, y)
(
x− e
y
)
≥ 0 (A.2)
and conversely, if x satisfies (A.2) then there exist p, q for which x solves (A.1).
Proof. Since x solves (A.1), then there exist λ, µ ≥ 0 such that
Du(x, y) = λp+ µ(x− e, y)
λp · (x− e, y) = 0
µ[(x− e)t(x− e) + yty − q2] = 0
(A.3)
Therefore,
Du(x, y) · (x− e, y) = λp · (x− e, y) + µ(x− e, y) · (x− e, y)
= µ(x− e, y) · (x− e, y) ≥ 0 (A.4)
Conversely, if x, y satisfies Du(x, y)(x− e, y) = 0, let
λ = 1
µ = 0
p = Du(x, y)
q2 = (x− e, y)(x− e, y).
(A.5)
7See Lemma A3 in Da´vila-Eeckhout (2008).
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If x, y satisfies Du(x, y)(x− e, y) > 0, let
λ > 0
µ =
Du(x, y)(x− e, y)
(x− e, y)(x− e, y)
p =
1
λ
[
Du(x, y)− Du(x, y)(x− e, y)
(x− e, y)(x− e, y) (x− e, y)
] ≥ 0,6
q2 = (x− e, y)(x− e, y).
(A.6)
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.
If a ∈ Rn++ and b /∈ Rn+ are such that ab > 0, then
a− a · b
b · b b ≥ 0. (A.7)
Proof.
We provide the proof for the case n = 2. The general case is then established
applying this case in the 2-dimensional space spanned by the vectors a and b.
Since a ∈ R2++ and ab > 0, then b /∈ −R2+. Since b /∈ −R2+ and b /∈ R2+, then
b1b2 < 0. Assume, without loss of generality that b1 < 0 and b2 > 0. Note first
that, for all a ∈ R2++, the inequality a− a·bb·b b ≥ 0 holds if, and only if,
a
‖a‖ −
b
‖b‖ cos âb ≥ 0. (A.8)
Since a ∈ R2+, ab > 0, and b1 < 0, then it trivially holds
a1
‖a‖ −
b1
‖b‖ cos âb ≥ 0. (A.9)
Moreover, since b1 < 0, then
b1
(
a1
‖a‖ −
b1
‖b‖ cos âb
)
≤ 0 (A.10)
but since, for any a, b ∈ Rn, it holds
2∑
i=1
bi
‖b‖
(
ai
‖a‖ −
bi
‖b‖ cos âb
)
= 0, (A.11)
then
b2
(
a2
‖a‖ −
b2
‖b‖ cos âb
)
≥ 0 (A.12)
and finally, since b2 > 0, hence
a2
‖a‖ −
b2
‖b‖ cos âb ≥ 0. (A.13)
Q.E.D.
6 This is a consequence of Lemma 2 below
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